Beyond A Simple Dichotomy: The Interdependence of Rights and Interests in Animal Ethics

Abstract

This paper examines the principal conflict in animal ethics: whether moral consideration for nonhuman animals is to be based upon inherent rights, as Tom Regan argues, or upon interests that are morally relevant, as Peter Singer claims. The paper traces the philosophical origins of this dispute, starting with John Locke's human-centred rights doctrine, and continuing with the utilitarian conception of Singer and the deontological rights-based view of Regan. This paper argues that these two do not have to be seen as mutually exclusive. Rather, this paper contends that rights and interests are interdependent. Rights protect fundamental interests, and these fundamental interests (e.g., the avoiding of suffering) form the basis for both human rights and broader moral rights. It is concluded that a synthesis of the two approaches into an "interest-derived rights" theory yields a more viable, and ethically coherent, theory of animal protection, and avoids the practical traps of pure utilitarianism and the possible rigidity of a pure rights-based formalism.